I believe this is the earliest reference to my Index Test Box. Lee Sheldon started at HDC in 2002, so this predates his involvement. Lee says he introduced my Index Test Box to HDC as a possibility, and has no idea what this refers to.

Ed Miska denied any knowledge. Rod Wittinger told Tom Murphy over dinner while we were all at McNary Dam in December 2005 that he had been watching Woodward’s patent, waiting for it to expire before he made his move.

This is the earliest reference to my Index Test Box in the FOIA documents.

Lee Sheldon started at HDC in 2002, so this predates his involvement with the project.

Lee said he introduced my Index Test Box to HDC as a possibility, and has no idea what this refers to.

Ed Miska denied any knowledge whatsoever.

Rod Wittinger told the group (Tom Murphy, Rod, Greg Luna and me) at dinner in Umatilla OR while we were testing the ITB at McNary Dam in December 2005 that he had been watching Woodward’s patent, waiting for it to expire before moving to acquire it for the government. I chided him that my engineering logbook said he was skeptical in 1985 when he came to see me during a Woodward governor school gathering.

Rod corrected himself saying that he was skeptical until he saw the ITB in use at Bull Run Dam. The test report was written by Gary Hackett of Portland General Electric as a dis-interested 3^rd party. Neither PGE nor Gary had any state in the ITB so there was no conflict of interest.

1987-09-01 PGE-PHP-2 Bull Run Dam Test Report (Gary Hackett)

Figure 1 Gary Hackett's Conclusion Excerpted from Bull Run Dam Test Report

Within HDC the communications to setup the contract started about 6-months before the Patent expired.

Lee Sheldon called me from his Rehired Annuitant job at HDC to suggest I submit an unsolicited proposal to sell an ITB to the government.

I sent this budgetary quote for the system I was working on back the same day.

2003-02-06 ATECo Quote to Lee Sheldon at HDC (Albright)

Six months later Rod was pitching an optimization suite for the entire USACE turbine fleet.

2003-08-01 Optimizing the Corps Hydroelectric Generation on the Columbia River (Wittinger)

Within a week Rod was asking for money to do it.

2003-08-07 ITB Cost Estimate (Wittinger)

And sole-sourcing it to get the exact technology that I created at Woodward.

2003-08-29 ITB Scope of Work (Wittinger)

Identifies me as inventor and gets Mike Roll to sign off on it.

The Sole Source document however has an incorrect statement that presumes that the government paid for and thus owns the ITB technology.

The original ITB was developed by me at and for Woodward Governor Company in 1985.

Woodward paid $150,000 for the project and paid my time so the invention and Patent went to the company.

When the patent ran out and the Intellectual Property came into the public domain my new version of it was ensconced in a U.S. Copyright to protect it. The USACE Contracting Officer wrote the Special License Agreement that tied the Copyright into the Contract and decreed that the core-program had been written at private expense and could not be taken by this contract. What it didn’t say was the fine point of the law is that if I had invoiced only 1-penny for working on the core-program source code, then a full copy of that source code must be turned over so the government could appreciate what they bought in context.

BPA only bought One of the first ITBs from Woodward

BPA liked it so much they offered to buy an ITB for every USACE Dam and upgrade all of the governors to the latest, greatest Woodward design to make them compatible with the new ITB.

The cost of this project was forecast at over $30 million and the forecast had paybacks of less than a year.

HDC declined BPA’s offer in favor of duplicating Woodward’s (my) ITB, so BPA’s ITB project died.

2003-08-07 ATECo Sole Source Justification (HDC)

The Sole Source Justification starts out with the False Statement that the original ITB was developed under a BPA contract. This is untrue.

The original ITB was developed on a $150,000 project at Woodward Governor Company in 1984 by me.

Figure 2 Excerpt from Sole Source of Supply Justification

I was not a fire control technician. I was a ground radio maintenance technician.

2003-09-01 ITB Project Specification.htm

The Project Specification also makes false claims.

Figure 3 Excerpt from ITB Project Specification

This is wrong - HDC didn’t pay for development of the ITB. The government only bought 1 ITB and signal

conditioner box to scale and offset the transducer output of to maximize the 12-bit A/D board input resolution and the labor to adapt the ITB to the GDACS.

This is a false statement.

The Corps only bought 1 ITB from ATECo.

The contract also had provisions for up to 320 ea. ITB’s for $3.2-million, but development costs of the core-program software were all paid by ATECo.

There is a requirement is that open solicitations must be made even if they’re for sole sourcing.

2003-09-06 USACE ITB Solicitation #1 (HDC)

The first one took the source code so a second was written that did not.

2003-09-12 USACE ITB Solicitation #2 (HDC)

The solicitation drew a false claim by American Governor Company that their personnel created the ITB back in the day at Woodward.

2003-10-24 AGCo Claims ITB.pdf

2004-05-26 USACE Contract W9127N-04-D-0009 for Type-1 Optimizer (Ebner) was signed May 26, 2004.

We tried to do as much preparation and interface design work as possible prior to the first trip to Portland.

Three (or more) trips were planned; we wanted the first trip to accomplish more than just familiarization and introductory tasks, but conflicting information from Corps technical personnel and other vendors that were already supplying equipment to HDC about the hardware configuration and availability of RS-232 computer communication ports made this impossible.

July 4, 2004 Copyright applied for

July 19, 2004 Copyright approved

1.) Trip to Portland, August 23-28, 2004 - One week before my trip to Portland in August, Lee Sheldon (A “rehired annuitant” listed in the Contract as an “HDC Contact”) setup a meeting with Steve Atkinson (the mechanical engineer on the 3-D cam development team for HDC), Clay Fouts, (HDC’s liaison to Automated Control Systems Incorporated [ACSI], the “captive-supplier” that I am alleging contracting favoritism to), and Joe Fisk (from the GDACS maintenance team). We wanted to have a meeting with the “movers and shakers” on the project so we could get the whole story and make a plan with everyone in agreement while I was there. All three of these men said they’d be available to attend our planned meeting. When I got there on Monday morning (Aug 23), We learned that all three of these men had taken the whole week off as vacation with no forwarding or contact information, and had left instructions with their subordinates that no communication was to be had with any outsiders (specifically me), intentionally blocking any progress during the first scheduled trip to Portland. Despite prior agreement to meet with me, the three key players I needed to meet with stood me up.

2.) August 23 2004- By late Monday morning I found a GMT member with the information we needed that didn’t get the notification that I was to be avoided. We had the meeting to discuss the GDACS hardware & software, and made a workable plan for how to proceed¹. It was decided that I would work with an HDC-designed 3-D cam that was a “stand-alone” configuration instead of the integrated GDACS 3-D cam that they actually used to control the turbines. This was so that I could do my testing and ITB demonstration without connecting my computer directly to their GDACS control system. When we went to McNary Dam to see the 3-D cam, we found that the intended stand-alone 3-D cam had been removed, supplanted with an obsolete, useless, non-functional Seawell 3-D Cam computer, effectively blocking the hardware interface inspection that was planned for this trip to McNary Dam. This surprise hardware substitution made the specified equipment unavailable to me while I was in Portland.

McNary Dam

Seawell 3-D Cam

GDACS 3-D Cam

GDACS 3-D Cam Mockup

McNary Dam

Seawell 3-D cam on Governor Cabinet

GDACS 3-D Cam on Governor Cabinet

GDACS 3-D Cam MockUp

3.) The Contract specified that I was to use a GDACS Mockup that was known to be located in the HDC facility. Shortly after the Contract was signed, the Mockup went missing, and while I was in Portland, we found it in the storeroom at ACSI, disassembled and scattered about the room, rendered useless as a test-bed for the project. Test-bench equipment written in my Contract had been removed, disassembled and hidden by HDC personnel to prevent my use of it.

Footnotes

Let me add an anecdote about Rod Wittinger, my TL’s perception of the situation at the start of the project when I was in Portland in August 2004. After the meeting at HDC (where I had to find and recruit a GMT representative because everyone from GMT who was supposed to be available to meet with me was on vacation) I was sitting with Rod Wittinger (my TL, the HDC Senior Mechanical Engineer at that time) discussing the meeting’s relative success. He seemed skeptical, so I asked if he thought my plans wouldn’t work. He said that technically, he was certain I could make it work, but realistically, he didn’t think, “they would let me make it work.” I asked him, “Who are they?” He just chucked, changed the subject and invited me to lunch. All too soon the reason for his reservations became clear to me.
Over lunch, Rod explained that there was an internal struggle going on at HDC. Their Captive Supplier, Automated Control Systems Incorporated (ACSI). ACSI had completed the objectives in their contract to construct and install the GDACS at McNary, and were supposed to be finishing up and turning the documentation for the GDACS over to HDC. Some higher-ups at HDC didn’t want to divest HDC of the Captive Supplier, hence the struggle. Rod warned that I should guard my Intellectual Property well because some within HDC who wanted to retain the Captive Supplier would devise a failure mode for the ITB field test where I could not accomplish the goal, but then the Captive Supplier would swoop in on their white horse wearing a white hat with a solution in their shirt pocket to whip out and apply, fixing the problem easily, thus they would be the heroes and I would be the goat. They’d walk away with my $3.4 Million dollar contract in their pocket and I’d be left wondering what had happened.
Their plan almost worked, but a broken wire in a hastily built prototype thwarted their plan and I was able to complete test field tests successfully.
Unfortunately, in the end the higher-ups won and I’m gone, and ACSI got my money and remains as the Captive Supplier to this day.

4.) August 28, 2004 returning home - it had been decided that the computer-to-computer communication method would be setup by me using a standard RS-232 port and SoftPLC’s (free) ComGenie utility program, using SoftPLC’s TopDoc® programming environment to edit the software in the Corps’ SoftPLC turbine control computer. HDC was supposed to buy the TopDoc software on their Government credit card and have it drop-shipped to me so that it would be Government property that I would turn over to HDC when I was done with it. Despite my continual pestering HDC’s GMT didn’t get around to ordering the software for over a month, and then had it sent to Portland instead of drop-shipping it to me as planned. The package had been opened when it arrived here 2 weeks later, and several inexplicable technical complications with setting up and using SoftPLC’s TopDoc program delayed gaining access to editing the software in the SoftPLC computer for another 3 weeks. When the equipment and software was finally all together and working, it was learned that there was never any editable software in the SoftPLC computer. GMT simply ignored my protests and changed their directives to have me work in another direction. Ralph Banse-Fay, the Contracting Officer, decreed that this was excusable ignorance on the part of HDC GMT personnel.

The entire SoftPLC TopDoc code editing exercise had been an expensive time & money wasting “wild-goose chase.”

5.) On October 12, 2004 an Email memo to the Contracting Officer’s Representative outlining difficulties with gaining access to the 3-D cam equipment prompted a “Stop-Work Order from October 14 to 25, during which time he called internal meetings at HDC that resolved the problems and persuaded GMT personnel to cooperate and provide access to the 3-D cam equipment (for a while).

2004-10-12 Pre-Stop Work Memo.pdf

2004-10-14 Stop_Work_Memo_and_causes.htm

Oct 28, 2004 HOT

Type 1 optimization

Ed Miska indicated that he is coordinating Type 1 optimization with GDACS at the projects. The team is developing a single prototype proof of concept for MCN unit 5, with the option of developing similar consoles for the rest of the system for about $10k each. At this time, the access point is not clear – they may be able to use the GDACS signal directly rather than obtaining it separately. Eventually the Type 1 optimization will need to coordinate with the digital governors and integrate with GDACS. There was some discussion about where to put the next index test box and the license involved.

Type 2 optimization

Lee Sheldon reported on the load sharing computer optimization program. The program is being tested; the next phase would upgrade it to an operational program. Ultimately for T2 optimization to be effective, BPA will need to improve its generation projections. T2 will have its first phase working by January 2005.

====================================================================================================

6.) December 2004 As a result of the Stop-Work Order, there were personnel changes², and a technical shift of direction. Dan Perrier of ACSI recommended, and Ed Miska of HDC directed me to switch communication method from the cheap, readily available RS-232 communication ports and the free ComGenie software to the OPC method, further directing that I must use the RSLinx product from Rockwell International. Rockwell marketing professed RSLinx worked with Visual Basic (the computer language that I was using), but it does not. After purchasing $3,350 worth of RSLinx software and struggling with it for 5 weeks, Rockwell finally admitted they don’t really support Visual Basic, telling me the wasted time was my fault for trying to use it with Visual Basic - and not reading their service bulletins that said so. HDC GMT (Ed) directed that I use RSLinx on the recommendation of ACSI (Dan).

Footnote:

²The Personnel Changes were to remove Clay Fouts as the HDC liaison to ACSI and contact person for my project, replacing him with MK. Both Clay Fouts and MK, were already liaisons from USACE HDC to ACSI, as explained below:

When the difficulties I was running into became excessive 5 months into the project, I described them in a letter to my COR, Dave Ebner, who put a “Stop-Work” order on the project because of the overt and covert resistance I was always running into. Dave used the heightened clout from the Stop-Work order to call meetings and find out who was causing so much trouble. Dave found that it was Clay Fouts working against me.

Click here: 04-10-12 Status Report that prompted Stop-Work

Clay was the official liaison from USACE HDC to ACSI. Dave found that in that capacity Clay was protecting ACSI’s business with HDC by preventing anyone from getting close to or learning anything about the turbine control systems; seemingly to prevent anyone from finding out how screwed-up the governor 3-D cams that HDC and ACSI designed and built were.

Dave’s fix action from the Stop-Work order was to have Clay removed as the liaison to ACSI, but it didn’t really help. MK, the assistant liaison was promoted into the slot; he was just as obstructive as Clay, or worse.

What is significant about Mark was that when I needed ACSI’s street address about a year ago, I Googled the words, “automated,” “control,” “systems” and “incorporated” to get the address from the Internet. I found that ACSI was incorporated in Oregon, while their company is located in Washington. That’s no a big deal, there is a legal tax advantage from setting it up that way; but the search engine also gave three other very similar company names (below).

Company Name -date of incorporation distance from Portland

President

Address

==================================================

ABBAJAY AUTOMATED CONTROL SYSTEMS, LLC -2005 120 miles

DAVID ABBAJAY

BEND OR 97701

ACS-AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS, INC. –1996 to 2005 7 miles

RJ K

BEAVERTON OR 97006

AUTOMATED CONTROL SYSTEMS, INC. –1995 8.1 miles

DANIEL K PERRIER

VANCOUVER WA 98682

AUTOMATED SYSTEM CONTROLS, INC. –1999 21.5 miles

RICHARD L MCELDERRY JR

NEWBERG OR 97132

Note that the bottom two companies on the list have the two middle words in the name switched around, so instead of “Automated Control Systems Incorporated,” it’s “Automated System Controls Incorporated.” That company was incorporated 4 years after ACSI’s incorporation in 1995.

Even more curious is “ACS Automatic Control Systems Incorporated.” The President, Secretary and Registered Agent for this company are all RK. The white pages in the phone book (available over the Internet) show that RK is the wife of MK, the assistant liaison from HDC to ACSI. Googling RK’s name found she was a full-time teacher at their local community college; she probably doesn’t have the specialized knowledge required to run a controls company, and as a full-time teacher at the college probably wouldn’t have the time anyway. Shortly after I started pushing back at HDC, Rk’s company was “administratively dissolved” on July 1, 2005.

When this cozy arrangement was set-up in 1995, it wasn’t possible to search the Internet and find the Oregon Secretary of State’s website when looking westward from Illinois to check on this stuff - score 1 for the Internet.

When I first started complaining to Mr. Jones at USACE IG, he tried to protect the status quo by deflecting my complaints and placating me. Army IG had pigeonholed an earlier DOD IG complaint for 180 days, and then closed it without any action. However, when I brought the corporate “shell game” described above to DOD IG’s attention, my contact there said, “We’ve seen this sort of thing before; these are “shell-companies that are used to move money and material around in secret.” Using this perceived impropriety, DOD IG bypassed Army IG and directed USACE IG to do a proper investigation into my complaints by elevating the priority from an “information” to an “action” item, and the respondent from whoever happened to answer the phone at HDC to the 2-Star General in charge of the Division in Portland. They won’t tell me anything; but apparently something happened. General Martin, the Major General in charge of the Portland Division of USACE accepted a transfer shortly after this happened and left town.

http://www.actuationtestequipment.com/USACE_Docs/2007-11-07_General_Martin_moves_on.html

7.) In February 2005, I unilaterally switched to Software Toolbox’s TopServer. When I got the OPC server working, HDC refused to give me the configuration and OPC data tag-names for their GDACS control system, claiming Homeland Security Act prohibited it; directing me instead to purchase this sensitive information from another supplier (ACSI) for $1,000.

April 22, 2005 HOT

Link to Ed Miska 05-04-22 T1-Future memo Ed is making plans for the Index Test Box, but he had never index tested a turbine, and didn’t know what the Winter Kennedy taps were for at this point in the project.

2005-06-22 What_Ed_Miska_Directed_Me_To_Remove_From_ITB_Rev1_br4.pdf

8.) In May 2005, the Index Test Box was delivered to HDC. GMT (Ed) insisted that the visual graphic displays on the ITB be removed so that the powerplant personnel could not observe the positioning inaccuracy of the 3-D cam, blade controller - essentially defeating the purpose of the ITB.

This changed my participation from investigating turbine control system performance and redefining 3-D Cam surfaces to make the machines work better and more efficiency to becoming a co-conspirator in the government’s cover-up that allows ACSI and other Captive Suppliers to remain on the Gravy Train.

9.) In May 2005, the 1-year performance period of the contract expired. HDC directed that a Contract Mod must be signed before I could continue work and getting paid. Negotiations to re-define the deliverables in our “Time and Material” Contract took over a month. When the contract was presented to me for signature, it had secretly been tampered with by unauthorized personnel (Ed again) without the knowledge or approval of the COR or myself. The text of the contract had been altered in such a way as to compel me to give HDC the Source Code to the ITB software program without the agreed upon compensation. I refused to sign the Contract it until it was restored to the text we had agreed upon. It took the urging of my Congressman Don Manzullo (a kid from the neighborhood when I was in high school) to DOD to get it changed.

The contract was not restored to the agreed upon text for over 2 ½ months, causing a 10-week hiatus on the project.

June 2006,

HDC directed that I must sign a modified contract because the 1-year performance period had expired. I negotiated the terms and deliverables as long as the contract was on the table. We reached an agreement on the contract terms, and Dave Ebner sent it around for approvals.

2005-06 Type-1 Optimizer USACE Contract Mod

10.) June 2005 during this hiatus, HDC and ACSI personnel contrived a “Zero-Problem³” between in the Index Test Box to GDACS communication interface. This problem could not be reproduced with my equipment here. HDC (Ed and Dan) insisted the only way to solve this problem was for me to give them my Source Code so they could debug it. HDC pressured me to give the source code to HDC to have ACSI debug it for me. I refused, demanding that my proprietary software remain proprietary until HDC paid me the agreed-upon price of $750,000 for it. After months of struggling with this contrived problem that prevented any field-testing, the Zero Problem just went-away without explanation, but was easily reproduced on demand by GMT (Ed) in August 2004 for Rod Wittinger to see when he reassumed the Technical Lead position. GMT and ACSI had retained a known defective version of the ITB software program to demonstrate the “zero-problem” whenever it suited them.

Footnote:

^3. The “Zero Problem” was a complicated and contrived computer problem engineered by Ed Miska of HDC and Dan Perrier of ACSI to sabotage the Index Test Box field test at McNary Dam and discredit my product, my company & me.

From the first day of the project, my main task was to establish communication between my IBM PC computer and the Corps’ SoftPLC computer that is used in the Corps’ Generic Data Acquisition and Control System (GDACS) in order to get the data about the turbine efficiency performance.

To make the ITB system work, this communication had to go two-ways in order to:

1.) Get the turbine performance data from the GDACS and,

2.) Send blade angle setpoint position values from my ITB to the GDACS 3-D cam.

My quotes, test plan and Contract specified the industry standard RS-232 communication port that was already in the SoftPLC computer. Because it was a “time and material” contract, HDC could make changes unilaterally. Dan Perrier of ACSI recommended, and Ed Miska directed that I must change the communication method from the cheap, abundantly available RS-232 communication port that I was already familiar with to the more expensive Ethernet based OPC communication method that I had never used before. I complained of the added time and expense of this to the COR, but he sided with them because it was “time and material.”

Furthermore, HDC specified that I must use the RSLinx OPC software from Rockwell International for this. Ed softened this directive by saying I would only need to buy the $850 RSLinx driver software; he promised to loan me the RSLinx communication development system software that I would need “one-time” to program the ITB to use the RSLinx driver software program. A few weeks later, he reneged on this and I had to buy the $2,500 program development software anyway.

I tried to get technical assistance from HDC to make this method of communication work, but Ed didn’t know how to do it himself so he couldn’t help. ACSI was using RSLinx communication software; Dan Perrier, President of ASCI had recommended it to HDC for my project, but wouldn’t help me with it until ACSI received a task-order from HDC, so they wouldn’t help either.

Later, I found that Rockwell doesn’t actually support Visual Basic, and the RSLinx software was just another dead-end. Learning this, I switched from RSLinx to Software Toolbox’s TopServer (these cost $850 each; I had to buy 2 of them for $1,700). This communication software worked after a fashion, but I needed specific configuration information about the GDACS and the actual data “tag-names” HDC was using so I could write the specified OPC communication programming.

HDC said the data tag-names were “sensitive information;” they were prohibited from giving it to me by the Homeland Security Act. Ed directed me to buy this information directly from ACSI instead, along with the configuration assistance I needed; this cost $1,000 that went to ACSI.

I had wanted to get both directions of communication working perfectly before sending the ITB out to Portland, but before I could get this accomplished, in May 2005 HDC (Ed again) insisted I send the ITB computer out there immediately with only the uni-directional communication working; this was in order to show that I was doing something for the money I was getting thus far.

Ed said that after the ITB computer was in Portland, I could just send software program updates to him we mutually developed and tested the blade-moving communication software. The plan was for Ed to receive the developmental software program updates from me, and then install & test them there. (Later I was criticized for having HDC doing my testing work for me, when it had been HDC’s directive that I do it this way.)

While I was struggling with the OPC communication software here – before I sent the ITB to Portland – HDC refused to release the task-order for ACSI to assist. It wasn’t until after they got my ITB computer into Ed Miska’s hands would HDC release the task-order to get ACSI’s help.

While developing the OPC communication interface, I was sending test programs to Portland with changes as dictated by Ed Miska and Dan Perrier. As expected, some of the program revisions I sent out there didn’t work exactly right, and they took advantage of this.

During this development phase, Ed and Dan secretly retained a version of my ITB program that had a software bug, a computer program problem that randomly sent “zeros” to the SoftPLC over the OPC communication port instead of a valid command signal value. Dan wrote a small patch program for the SoftPLC to handle this problem that they then loaded into the SoftPLC computer as a patch to fix this contrived problem.

2005-12-16 Bad_Program_Icon.pdf

I continued perfecting my ITB software program to fix all of the problems encountered, including this “zero-problem,” sending many updated versions to HDC. Every once in a while Ed Miska would load and run the known-to-be-buggy “zero-problem” version of my program into the ITB computer to show other people at HDC that the zero-problem had surfaced again, professing that the problem was persistent and preventing any field testing - and that my programs written and compiled here and then sent to Portland for him to load and test weren’t working properly. I was always unable to duplicate the zero-problem here.

Ed and Dan both said the only way to solve this problem was that I must send my entire ITB program source code to Portland so they could debug the problem with the program there. Rod Wittinger and Dave Ebner, not knowing enough about computers to understand what was happening and appreciate the problem, agreed with Ed and Dan. I adamantly refused all of them, insisting that I wasn’t going to give them my entire source code until they paid me the $750,000 price we had negotiated for it at the onset of the project. After they had the source code in hand, they wouldn’t need to pay for it…

To figure this problem out, I got assistance from Software Toolbox Company about how to use their diagnostic utility provided with their TopServer Program. With Software Toobox’s help, we figured out Ed Miska and Dan Perrier’s “Zero-Problem” ruse and I accused Ed of unethical behavior in our next “Partnering Meeting.” Nobody else at HDC had the computer expertise to grasp what had been happening or whom to believe on this, so they believe their guys; Ed and Dan, and called me “paranoid.”

After another few weeks at loggerheads, Ed folded and declared, “Good news, the zero problem is gone!” The problem that had previously been persistent and unsolvable had mysteriously disappeared. Despite HDC’s directive for me to let it go and just move on - I kept pushing to get to the bottom of the technical problem that Ed and Dan had fabricated in order to expose their dirty tricks. With the help of Software Toolbox Company tech support I figured it out, but I couldn’t get anyone at HDC to understand or appreciate what had happened, they just wouldn’t believe that one of their own could do such a deceitful and counterproductive thing.

At one point, as I tried to explain it to the ITB Project team (Rod W, Lee S, Dave E, Dan R and Ed) in a conference call and Ed was fabricating excuses to explain it away by changing the facts, I shouted, “You’re Busted, Ed!” And went on to explain what had happened. Ed was silent for the rest of that meeting. Later that day, Ed demonstrated the zero-problem again for Lee, Dave, Dan and Rod to show it was real, but none of them noticed his slight-of-hand when he clicked on the “Bad Program” desktop icon they had placed on the desktop of my ITB computer, an icon that was linked to a defective version of the program with a “known-bug” in order to show that the zero-problem still existed.

At that same time, I was refusing to sign the tampered contract, so I couldn’t get paid for working on the project, and nobody from my company was permitted to attend the field test in August 2005 where Ed Miska and Dan Perrier took my ITB to McNary Dam to run the field-test without anyone from my company in attendance.

At the point, Dick Nelson had made Ed Miska the project Technical Lead, supplanting Rod Wittinger in this position it was Ed’s decision that HDC didn’t need anyone from my company in attendance for the field test, they could “handle-it” without us.

During that field-trip test in July 2005, a fortuitous equipment failure where a frayed wire in my hastily constructed prototype signal conditioner broke off and prevented them from measuring the water flow signal. In frustration, Rod Wittinger re-assumed command and canceled the field test. Everyone went home, and they Fed-Ex overnighted the failed test box back to me with a nasty letter.

When it was received here, my technician opened the signal conditioner box and fixed the broken wire in less than 5 minutes. When I explained what happened to Rod, he took the facts to HDC higher-ups. Rod was reinstated as the TL and Ed was removed from the project. I never had to work with Ed again, but he was always on the sidelines causing as much trouble as he could.

After an HDC reorganization that changed the hydropower from 3 separate agencies (Eastern, Central and Western brances) a single USACE hydropower central authority was established at HDC. ed Dick Nelson was not elevated from Western Branch chief to head-up HDC, instead returning to his prior position as head of the governor and computers group.

12.) In July 2005, while the contract was not signed, HDC and ACSI took the Index Test Box to McNary Dam to test/demonstrate it. Because I refused to sign the altered contract, no representative of my company was allowed to attend the test in Portland. The bullying consisted of 1.) either sign the altered contract and give away my source code, or 2.) refuse to sign it and be prohibited from participating in the test. I chose 2.

13.) During the August 2005 field-test trip, a fortuitous hardware problem prevented Ed and Dan from measuring the Winter Kennedy water flow signal, the test was aborted and the hardware returned to me FedEx overnight for repair the next morning. A broken wire in the prototype signal conditioner box was located and fixed by my technician in 5 minutes. When I explained to Rod that the ITB signal conditioner was a prototype which are humble and don’t travel well. Had my technician or myself been able to attend the test this simple repair could have been done on the spot and the testing gone forward immediately. The furor this caused exposed the shenanigans being pulled so as a result of this SNAFU the problematic individual from GMT (Ed) was removed from the project, the contract text was corrected to the agreed-upon form, I signed it, and Rod Wittinger was restored as the Technical Lead on the project.

14.) In September 2005, a second field test was undertaken, this time with my technician in attendance. This test was canceled when a perceived leak in the flow signal pressure lines prevented this measurement - when in fact the problem was improperly identified Winter-Kennedy pressure tap lines. Pressure signal connections had been checked against the powerplant drawings before leaving the facility. It was later learned that the powerplant drawings were already known to be in error from previous work at McNary by HDC, but had not been corrected. I’m curious to know if the drawings were corrected this time; this problem wasted $16,000 of project funds.

Oct 13, 2005 HOT

Action Item for T1: HDC to coordinate Phase I and II data to the PMs in time for the districts to prepare an amendment to the next CWG (November 1-2, 2005). [REN note, HDC’s proposal did not yet include a schedule]

T2 OPTIMIZATION

Economic Dispatch – done without turning units on and off

Unit Commitment – considers starting/stopping units

On a look ahead basis

On an instantaneous basis

HDC T2 Action: although a general work scope and 2101 spending schedule has been completed and sent to the district PM, our HDC detailed plan, milestones, schedules, etc. have NOT yet been completed. This needs to be done soon. Players are the GMT and PC (Larry Haas).

15.) In December 2005 we conducted a successful field test at McNary Dam with Rod Wittinger (USACE), Dan Ramirez (USACE) Greg my technician) and myself in attendance⁴. It was learned that the 3-D cam blade controller had an excessive deadband error. The testing demonstrated the Index Test Box worked properly, but the testing was not wildly successful due to the sub-standard control system designed and built by USACE and ACSI personnel. Rod Wittinger reported this in his Memo for the Record.

2005-12 Rod Wittinger and Dan Ramirez ITB Trip Report

2006-01-16 McNary Field Test (Albright)

Footnotes:

⁴Since 1985, Lee Sheldon has been a mentor to me on this project. It was his phone call that initially got me involved with HDC in 2003 and his advice and guidance that helped me stay out of any serious trouble while working on it. When I went to Portland for the test at McNary in December 2005, the test for “all the marbles,” there was another problem:

When I went to Portland in December 2005 for the big test, there was a complaint made to USACE IG that Lee Sheldon was showing favoritism to me and my company on this project. Even if he was, it should not have been objectionable to anyone; this was a “sole-source” contract solicitation (B-Up File) because HDC had specifically wanted me on the project due to my name on the patent for the Automatic Index Test Box for Kaplan Turbines that HDC wanted me to produce for them. Lee’s boss at HDC directed him to stay away from me while I was in Portland for the week of the field test in order to avoid any trouble with the IG - for as long as there was a complaint against Lee for favoring me. As a result, Lee was prohibited from going to McNary to help us work on the field test. Later, we were told that Dan Perrier of ACSI had lodged the complaint. After I had returned home, Dan retracted the complaint.

When I learned what happened, I protested Dan’s cynical use of the IG to disrupt my planned trip to Portland by excluding my most helpful contact at HDC. Because the IG complaint was retracted with no findings, the official position of the IG was again “no harm no foul,” but there was harm. Our chances of success were diminished by this cynical IG complaint and misuse of the IG by the GDACS Maintenance Team.

January 1, 2006

2016-01-16 Report on ITB Field Test on Unit 9 at McNary (Albright)

Jan 25, 2006 HOT notes

T1 – Dan suggests doing the next T1 test at IHR in February, coincident with the IHR index tests.

Procure additional GDACS ITB ~$12k means buy the hardware for another project test (a multiple unit test)

By testing at DWR instead of CHJ,

T1- Future work – add WK transducers

Team set up to determine the best course of action of what to do next with T1 – recommend both a technical and contractual action plan to get us into the next phase. Team members Ed, Jack, Jerry, Rod, Dan, Dave S. Report back to the HOT in 4 weeks.

Approval Action: NOTE – the phase details have been changed since last meeting; the new Phase I approved which will also include the WK program (in Future Work) [complete design of new WK transducers with plan to install on all Kaplan units];

Clarification of HOT Approval Action:

T1 06 – everything on Dan’s pg 2; and the WK proposal from the last page

Budget only for WK installation, and LWG and DWR ITB demonstration projects (last two bullets on page 2) – this one will require subsequent HOT approval.

T2 – STATUS

Task order ready to issue, but delayed by property right issues. Delayed by CoE. Assuming award 12 Dec Schedule calls for testing at BO in Aug 06; but this has been delayed. Money issues OK – just waiting to resolve the property right issues.

Jan 25, 2006 HOT meeting

16.) In February 2006, another successful field test at Ice Harbor Dam indicated close correlation between ATECo Index Test Box and USACE’s normal test equipment setup.

Dan Ramirez reported this in an Email to Rod Wittinger. 2006-02-21 Dan Ramirez Ice Harbor report.

Upper left is relative data comparing COE index test result and ITB PostProcessor analysis result. These are effciency profiles from a 2001 index test and optimization at The Dalles. The math shows that

Vertical offset is OK because it’s “relative” data. The sliding-scale factor could place them on top of each other. if fully captured a 1% increase at the 70MW sweet spot would return (8760 * 70 *0.01) MWHrs of power added

Note the higher scatter in the COE data set. To the electrical grid annually.

At 60% utilization the actual increase is 3,697.2MWHrs. At $30/MWHr that’s $110,376 to the Federal Treasury.

Energy cannot be created or destroyed. Energy is fungible. Energy in one form can be equated to energy in another form using any currency of choice.

In the end, all currencies are equated to the oldest, most trusted and universal standard of value: gold.

Sources close to the situation say that the benchmark for “Close enough for Government Work” is 2%, so by this allowable tolerance the 1% available efficiency increase shown by the 10 Sept 2001 index test would be discarded as not worth the trouble of updated the 3-D Cam surface.

According to CarbonFund.org the US average source emissions for electricity using EPA’s eGRID emission factor is 0.9884 lbs CO2 per kWh (0.4483 kgs CO2 per kWh).

Using the more conservative 60%utilization value of 3,697.2 MWHrs is equivalent to releasing 1,827 tons of CO2 into the air annually from not installing the new cam profile into the governor 3-D Cam.

These events were summed up in an HTML page that showcases HDC’s PowerPoint slides delivered to the HOT.

2006-03-03 HOT PowerPoint (HDC)

17.) In April 2006, GMT Personnel claimed that the “Index test box code already running on Walla Walla GDACS platform.” This was a false claim; the Index Test Box code only runs on the stand-alone IBM PC that was purchased from my Actuation Test Equipment Company.

April 14, 2006

The FOIA documents show that Tom Murphy, the Chairman of BPA’s HOT Committee was out trapesing

2006-04-24 BPA_to_Corps_with_ppt (Murphy)

Link to 06-04-24 HOT PowerPoint

2006-03 Index Test Box Code Running On GDACS (HDC)

18.) In May 2006, HDC personnel told HOT committee they wanted to buy two more ITBs from my ATECo, while at the same time drafting a solicitation for another company to make a replica of it, while actually setting up funding for another project at ACSI to make a knock-off of my instrument that would mimic my methods and techniques by “…augmenting FTE to work on T1.” The funds in my contract were diverted to HDC under pretense of sending it to me…

May 23, 2006 Hot Agenda

ONGOING TASKS

Type 1 optimization: Wittinger

Software solicitation

June 3, 2006 HOT Sub-Group Meeting PowerPoint presentation slides

Link to 06-03-03 HOT PowerPoint

2006-05-23

May 23, 2006 HOT Meeting

2006-03-28_ATECo_Ice_Harbor_Analysis

2006-06-06

19.) June 6, 2006, HOT committee chairman sent an Email to HDC personnel apologizing because DOE “legal folks” wouldn’t allow HOT to fund ACSI’s knock-off project as planned.

2006-06-08 Contract In-House for ITB (HOT)

From: Murphy,Thomas R - PGF-6 [mailto:tmurphy@bpa.gov]
Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2006 10:01 AM
To: Nelson, Richard E NWP; Wittinger, Rodney J NWP; Miska, Edward P NWP; Earlywine, Kenneth G NWP; Sheldon, Lee H NWP; vanderBorg, Robert D NWP
Cc: Jones,Mark A - PGF-6
Subject: Contract in-house for T1
Importance: High

We discussed at last HOT mtg the possibility for bringing help on board to work on T1.

HDC will investigate assembling an appropriate in-house/hired contractor team to develop the generic ITB via a method analogous to GDACS. Deliverable will be a proposal for a future HOT meeting which could be an alternative to advertising the generic ITB solicitation being developed in 8 above.

Because of the OMB investigation into the ITB contract our legal people have advised us not to do it this way. It might look like to much of a sole source with a compeitor (ACSI) that has been named in the investigation. I'm sorry about having to go at it the long way-not a perfect world. I guess we should proceed with the spec as quickly as we can.

The OMB investigation most likely was caused by DOE IG’s referral of my complaints to DOD IG:

2006-06-13 CID_Report_FA14-2035.pdf

The CID report draws a conclusion from the Sole Source Justification instead of following the Contract. The Contract excludes the core-program by identifying 4 code function-modules as “prior art” and a Special License Agreement to tie in the U.S. Copyright that was acquired to protect the source code by proving it had been written before the Contract was signed and thus was written at private expense and ergo was private Intellectual Property. The government did not have rights to all source code, but pursuant to a side-deal outside the Contract could be purchased for $750,000 at any time. The government never paid the $750k so they never got to see the source code. It’s just business…

2006-06-01

2006-06-01 Improving Operations On The Columbia (Murphy)

Tom Murphy, Chairman of HOT committee wrote a report that credited Corps and Reclamation Engineers with T1 optimization, instead of properly stating that the ITB was purchased from the private sector (ATECo)

https://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-SA-51033.pdf

Page 11 Biological Index Testing

Second paragraph:

2006-06-29 BPA_Review_of_Contract_(Jones).pdf

Meaningless weasel worded pass the buck to HDC.

2006-07-01 Index Test Box Final Report uncirculated (Sheldon)

2006-09-01 Index Test Box Final Report from HDC to HOT (Sheldon)

20.) In August 2006, HDC prepared a One-Page document of distortions and half-truths in response to my IG complaints. These complaints were successful in blocking DOE funding of ACSI developing the replica of my instrument.

Aug 11, 2006 HOT Meeting

2006-08-13 Hydro_Review_excerpt_USACE_contract_AGCo.jpg

HDC’s digital governor project was canceled and they went outside to buy governors.

American Governor Company had stolen the Woodward product line from GE after Woodward sold the hydro division to GE. A weak response by GE AGCo was allowed to get away with it.

21.) In September 2006, HDC claimed my ITB was incompatible with their GDACS because it was written in Visual Basic and their GDACS was written in C++. This was done in order to allow them to get ACSI to write a C++ ITB program. My position was no problem, but the government must pay for the ITB code before it would be handed over. Because DOE IG prevented HOT from funding the proposed rewrite, HDC changed the name of the project to Gate Blade Optimizer (GBO) and then attempted to make their own index-testing instrument.

Curiously, this duplication attempt was not written in C++; instead it was written in LabView, a different language altogether. Multiple inquiries to HDC through USACE, DOD and DOE Inspectors General have not yet learned how my instrument could be successful at connecting to GDACS and index testing two USACE hydroelectric turbines at McNary and Ice Harbor Dams, yet could still be deemed “incompatible?”

2006-09-12 PowerPoint (HDC)

2006-09-12 PowerPoint Recommendations (HDC)

2006-09 INDEX TEST BOX memo to HOT (Sheldon)

22.) This “incompatibility” is how HDC justified turning away from my twice-successful instrument in favor of a replica of it to be developed by ACSI using Government funds.

23.) In September 2006, HDC presented a PowerPoint to HOT that recommended, “In-house engineering support services should be contracted to work under HDC supervision, to develop a stand alone ITB system, and then interface it into GDACS. This is exactly what they bought from my Actuation Test Equipment Company.

Sept 12, 2006 HOT Meeting

Sept12, 2006 PowerPoint presentation

Figure 4 ATECo ITB Ice Harbor Output Graph

Text Box:
Figure 5 ATECo ITB McNary Output Graph

Link to June 9, 2006 Powerpoint

25.) In January 2007, HDC stated they would no longer use the name “Index Test Box,” but at the same time claimed in a Job Posting on the Internet that, “A ‘proof of concept’ test has been successfully completed. A device known as an Index Test Box was developed under a prior contract and demonstrated that automatic unattended index tests can be successfully conducted” I questioned this job posting’s claim repeatedly of HDC personnel, who stated that mine was only one of a number of contracts that had purchased Index Test Box technology; claiming that instead of using mine, they simply went with someone else’s design. This is another lie.

2007-01-04 HDC_Job_Solicitation.pdf

2007-01-23 HOT_Minutes_No_Longer_Called_Index_Test_Box.htm

2007-03-11 Agenda

4. Type 1 Optimization (Sojka):

a. GBO Status

b. W-K Flushing System Status

c. Blade Angle Measurement JD U16 Status

2007-04-11

2007-05-16

2007-07-02 T1 Data Gathering Device Spec

2007-08-14

2007-12-06

Agenda

Type 1 optimization:

· Gate Blade Optimizer (GBO) Single Unit Installation (McN U9) Ramirez, Miska

· GBO / W/K taps automatic flushing system: Multi-Unit Development Sojka, Miska

· Blade angle measurement demonstration (JD U16) Sojka

· Software rewrite for Snake and McNary 3D cams Sojka, Nelson

2008-02-08 FOIA cover letter no other ITB contract (HDC)

26.) On February 8, 2008, after almost a year of repeated questioning and FOIA requests, HDC’s Freedom of Information Officer stated that “There have been no other contracts regarding the Index Test Box.” Click here: 2008-02-08 FOIA Cover Letter. The job posting was in error.

27.) The technology tested under the “proof of concept” test was not “developed under a prior contract” as claimed, it was purchased from my Actuation Test Equipment Company.

2008-03-11

need date for job description

March 25, 2008

Three-part Complaint to DOE IG: false statements, waste of funds and procurement favoritism.

2011-11-17 HOT Minutes

28.) Recently, after failing to make something workable themselves; HDC hired Professor Bart Rylander, a college professor from University of Portland who has the computer software expertise required to make an Index Test Box for them.

29.) Doesn’t it seem improper for a HDC to spend so much DOE money to reverse- engineer technology that the Government acquired from the private sector?

2013-05-21 HOT_JOC_Brief (BPA)

https://www.bpa.gov/news/FOIA/2012/12-01066/BPA-2012-01066-FResponse.pdf

2015-04-06 HOT Minutes

Definitions and Acronyms

ACSI = Automated Control Systems Incorporated, a “captive supplier” that does all hydropower engineering work for HDC.
ComGenie – free RS-232 port communication software provided by SoftPLC.
COR = Contracting Officer’s Representative
GDACS = Generic Data Acquisition And Control System, is the computer and communication system that the Corps uses to run the turbines in their powerhouses.
GMT = GDACS Maintenance Team, the group of Corps employees that work on the GDACS control system.
HDC = United States Army Corps of Engineers Hydro Design Center; the Corps’ technological center for hydropower engineer.
Mockup = a simulated GDACS control system for a turbine comprised of a SoftPLC computer and all Input/Output hardware, a cam mechanism and all software.
OPC = OLE for Process Control is the an industry standard Ethernet technology computer to computer communication protocol; more expensive and complicated than RS-232.
OLE = Object Linking Environment is Microsoft’s acronym for their computer digital communication method.
PLC = Programmable Logic Controller, a type of computer specifically designed for use in control systems applications.
RSLinx = OPC Server product by Rockwell International. A good product for many applications, but unsuitable for mine because it doesn’t work with Microsoft Visual Basic computer programming language.
RS-232 = industry standard computer to computer communication protocol, every standard computer has 2 or more RS-232 communication ports on it.
Seawell = A HDC designed and deployed 3-D cam from the early 1980’s. They were junk.
SoftPLC = the supplier of the industrial computer PLC that is used throughout the Corps power system.
Technical Lead (TL) – the top-man on any Corps of Engineers project
TopDoc = the programming interface allowing access to the code within SoftPLC’s computer.

End of file.

[DA1]