From: Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Sent: Friday, February 21, 2020 10:24 AM To: dudleydevices@aol.com Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] FW: Restart IG Complaint Mr. Albright, You are correct...the current statute (10 USC 2409) prohibits reprisal for employees of contractors, subcontractors, grantees,.... only. Unfortunately, it does not apply to the contractor. However, you can report wrongdoing if it pertains to the following items found at this link: https://www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/DoD- Hotline/Matters-appropriate-for-the-DoD-Hotline/ I am not in the position to assess if what you provided below meets the criteria for reporting, however, you can file and include the evidence you have for an assessment. Certainly, the time in which all of this took place, is probably a factor V/r Ken Kenneth M. Sharpless Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Administrative Investigations Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (703) 699-1794 -----Original Message----- From: dudleydevices@aol.com Sent: Friday, February 21, 2020 10:50 AM To: Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: Restart IG Complaint Hi Ken, Thank you for your call last week. It was encouraging. Reading over the websites you suggested, it seems that the Whistle blower statutes will protect my employees from retaliation from me but does not protect me or my company from retaliation from government agencies or personnel. Do I understand this correctly? You asked about Major General Gregg Martin. He was the target of the DOD IG "Action Item" that was the key to starting up the Blade Accuracy Survey that exposed the sub-standard blade control systems that HDC had created. I blew the whistle on this terrible turbine control system that was a main-product of HDC Engineers' favored Captive Supplier, Automated Control Systems Incorporated (ACSI) and HDC's demand that I join in on the cover-up to hide this mess from the powerplant operators by removing the display information from my Index Test Box that exposes it. As a result of the Blade Accuracy Survey and other factors HDC was relying on this one Sole directed to stop designing and building their own control system and Sourced supplier and to start buying control system equipment from legitimate, competent private sector suppliers. 2007-03-11 3-D_Cam_and_Blade_Survey_Part-1.pdf 2007-03-11 3-D_Cam_and_Blade_Survey_Part-2.pdf 2008-06-13 Digital Governor Solicitation (HDC) Here's the announcement about the General leaving Portland: 2007-11-07 General_Martin_moves_on.html Sybil (DOD IG Hotline contact) explained the difference between "Action Items" and "Information Items" and how they are processed differently. The main difference (as she explained it) is that an Action Item goes directly to the Commanding Officer of the target organization while Information Items must go through channels from DOD IG to Army IG to USACE IG to Portland USACE HQ to HDC and then to the responsible department and individuals, all handled by office staff along the way. Information items are likely not to get to their destination because at every step along the way they have a number of days (120 or 180 - I don't recall precisely how many) to act on the Item, and if they can't get around to dealing with it in the allotted time it is simply discarded and forgotten. After several Information Items inquiries got discarded, Sybil said we needed an "Indicator of Impropriety" to elevate this from an "Information Item" to an "Action Item." We Googled the names of everyone at HDC that was involved looking for unsavory connections. MK was an HDC engineer who was the 2nd liaison to their favored Captive Supplier, ACSI. MK's wife RK owned, operated and was the registered agent of a purportedly unrelated company called "ACS-Automated Control Systems Incorporated (ACSI). Sybil saw through this ruse and said this was what is called a "shell company" that would most likely be used to move money and material around in secret to pay bribes and such. This was a sufficient "indicator of impropriety" to elevate the allegation from an Information Item to an Action Item. DOD IG subsequently sent the inquiry directly to General Martin. You said I should prepare a narrative to explain what happened clearly and succinctly. Here's a draft of it that I'd like to share with you for your information only. Three items of new evidence I have are: At the end of the DOD IG and CID investigations the government concluded there was no proof that HDC engineers took my ITB project away from me in order to have it as their own enterprise to ensconce in their favored supplier, ACSI. Without such proof the IG would not do anything about it. My nemesis at HDC was an engineer named Ed Miska who was technologically unqualified to manage the Index Test Box project because (as he told me) he had never personally written any software code and it was obvious that he was unfamiliar with Index Testing Kaplan Turbines - the two main areas of the ITB Project. Ed was repeatedly put in charge of the project by Dick Nelson. Dick was a high-level manager within HDC and previously had been the chief engineer of the Western third of USACE's hydropower in the USA. Although not the "top-dog" at HDC in 2006, Dick was definitely (in the Rocky and Bullwinkle vernacular) "Mr. Big." Evidence of this allegation was received in a subsequent FOIA response years later as one of a number of encrypted emails. HDC refused to de-crypt them for me, saying that the Homeland Security Act regulations forbade decrypting these emails. A few years later they finally were decrypted to show that my primary allegation, that Ed wanted to take the Index Test Box project away from me in order to have it as a project for himself to work on was clearly stated by my Contracting Officer, Dave Ebner to Rod Wittinger (the Sr. Mechanical Engineer at HDC and Technical Lead on the Index Test Box project) and the rest of "the ITB team." Dave was rewarded for his candor and fair-handed conduct towards a supplier by losing his job for not being a "team player." 2006-01-26_Ed_Has_Conflict_of_Interest (read down to the 1-25-2006 email) Figure 1 Excerpt from Dave Ebner's Jan 25, 2006 Email to the ITB Team about Ed's plans for the ITB Ed was removed from the project a few months later after a spectacular demonstration of his technical incompetence during a field test at McNary Dam. Sans his interference the ITB project went forward and it's functionality was demonstrated successfully - twice - and then they pulled the trigger on their "Bait and Switch" scam to take it away from me. It was a lousy thing to do but is still a great story. I think I'll write a book about it. The central allegation in my complaint was that HDC engineers took the Index Test Box project away from me in order to have it for their own personal benefit. Their plan was to profit from it by first giving it to their Captive Supplier (ACSI again) in an exclusive, "Captive Supplier" relationship. ACSI would then mass produce and sell them back to the government. After some experience had been gained with the ITB they would then expand to selling them into the entire private sector market. The DOD IG and CID investigations concluded that because there was no proof of this allegation they would take no action. Well, now there is proof - sometimes it just takes a while to find it. I Found a Witness A few years ago I met a retiree from USACE who had interviewed for a post- retirement job at ACSI in 2006. While getting a facility tour during the interview he saw my ITB in a back-room there being "studied" or "reverse-engineered" to duplicate its functionality. He declined the job because he eschewed getting involved with such a nefarious deed. A key element of their "Bait and Switch" scam was that the DOE BPA HOT Chairman Tom Murphy was a co-conspirator with the HDC engineers and retirees at ACSI trying to co-opt my ITB. While I was demonstrating my ITB at McNary Dam, Tom was making a trip to the Walla Walla USACE facility to pitch my ITB as if it were a creation of government employees at HDC. Another FOIA brought another email from Tom about presenting a PowerPoint to USACE managers touting the Index Test Box as part of ACSI's product. 2006-04-24 BPA to Corps with ppt (Murphy) 2006-03-01 Pg14 ITB Code Running On GDACS.jpg Page 14 of this PowerPoint claims that the Index Test Box code (or software program) was already running on the Walla Walla integrated platform. This false statement claiming that my product is a component of ACSI's product as if I did not exist. In essence, there were Two Cabinet-level government agencies' personnel conspiring to claim my private sector technology to take the entire project to give to a more favored contractor. The documentation assembled undeniably shows this now. How it happened was that at the ITB project's moment of triumph HDC engineers pushed me aside and took unwarranted credit for the ITB, making false claims that it was they who had developed the ITB technology and I only did a minor bit of prototyping on their ITB project. Subsequent investigation found that HDC had perpetuated Intellectual Property theft of this type since 1975 from at least 3 other companies. The GDACS itself was reverse-engineered from SCIPAR's SCADA system that was installed at Chief Joseph Dam in 1975. A Universal Pilot Valve from L&S Electric was purchased and then replicated twice by local suppliers and the Type-2 Optimizer was the Opt-Ease program developed by Lee Sheldon years earlier at yet another company. What happened to my ITB project was a well-practiced gambit to commandeer technology and funding. Tom's role as the BPA HOT Committee chairman was to divert funding from my legitimate ITB project to ACSI's clandestine project to reverse-engineer it. These funds were earmarked to buy up to 320 of my ITBs after the two successful field test demonstrations. When this dubious diversion of funds was reported to DOE IG it brought an OMB audit of my contract. Another subsequent FOIA to DOE BPA brought an email from Tom that connects the dots between the DOE and DOD government employees that were conspiring to Bait and Switch my ITB project away from me and move it over to ACSI, 2006-06-08 Contract In-House for ITB.html. In this email Tom is apologizing that he can no longer write checks directly to ACSI to fund their project to reverse-engineer my ITB and that another way to access the funds in my contract was needed. HDC managers found a way to get around this prohibition by bringing the 3 men (all retirees from HDC) working on the ITB reverse-engineering project at ACSI back into the HDC facility as "Rehired Annuitants" to continue the reverse-engineering work. Tom resumed sending contract funds directly to HDC to continue funding the reverse engineering project. This was reported to DOD IG who said it was OK for government agencies to shift funds internally between projects. To my mind this elevated it to an organizational problem, not just a few bad actors working in the shadows. A fish rots from the head. To restate what happened more succinctly: After overlooking the initial fraud of deceiving everyone with their Bait and Switch scam - DOD IG said it was OK for BPA and HDC engineers to divert the $3.4 million remaining on my Contract (that was earmarked by DOE for the expressed purpose of buying up to 320 of my successfully demonstrated ITB for every USACE Dam on the Columbia River) to another, different project for the 3 "Rehired Annuitants" at HDC to reverse-engineer my ITB - as long as the reverse- engineering work to replicate the ITB was being done within the HDC facility. In the end - DOD IG would make no determination of who was telling the truth when HDC engineers and I both claimed to have created the same ITB Intellectual Property. It was said that a "wait and see" attitude would prevail until one of the claimants (either HDC engineers or me) demonstrated a successful test instrument. The government's position was that it would be preferable for the government to own the ITB technology so it could be utilized across the entire government hydropower fleet at the lowest possible cost to the government - arguably and ethically challenged position. As a result HDC government engineers got 14 years and > $5-million to reverse- engineer my ITB - but apparently were unsuccessful again. What changed to bring this to a head was that in 2016 is when President Trump took office he ordered all government agencies under his direct control to reduce expenses by 30%. This was not learned of (by me) until earlier this year. The "low hanging fruit" described was that BPA defunded and shut-down the HOT Committee and apparently HDC defunded and shut-down their GBO project at the same time, but HDC government engineers hid the fact from my FOIA inquiries for 3 more years. A FOIA request seeking HOT Meeting Minutes to DOE BPA brought a dubious and deceptive response that claimed the records of the HOT Meeting existed but were "inchoate," therefore I could not see them. A few months of appeals ended when the Judge denied my appeal on the grounds that the documents did not exist - but would not say that it was because the meeting never happened. Yet another FOIA request to BPA seeking further HOT Committee de-funding information got more of the story. As it turned out - the reason I couldn't see these records is because they never existed because there had been no HOT meeting. These facts were confirmed with BPA while HDC continued to claim that the GBO project was still ongoing and successful. A few weeks later I asked my Senator Duckworth to inquire via official channels about the status of the Gate Blade Optimizer project. The inquiry went through normal channels (DOD to Army to USACE to Pacific Northwest USACE down to HDC), but this time a different individual provided a candid and more believable answer: 2019-03-25 Letter From HDC on GBO Status.pdf When Senator Duckworth's Intern asked the first time - HDC's reply was that nobody there knew anything about the Gate Blade Optimizer project, suggesting perhaps it was at one of the dams upriver. If the name of the project were provided HDC could put us in contact with the responsible people there. A second request got the reply from Andrew Long, HDC Product Coordinator that says there are 10 remaining Gate Blade Optimizer systems, but apparently they had to search around to find them. Nine of them are stored in a Closet at The Dalles Dam and 1 of them is installed on a turbine at The Dalles, but the GBO cannot be validated so it cannot be used. The only way to validate the GBO (or my ITB) is to index test a turbine by the old-fashioned, accepted method and then retest it using the GBO (or the ITB) and if the results agree, it's validated. There is no plan for further index testing or work on the GBO project. Another year or so and the next facility clean- up at The Dalles would likely see them all go to scrap. Andrew said that "In order to validate proof of concept results index testing is recommended but has not been performed. Until validated GBO will not be installed on additional units." This is what failure looks like with government agencies. The evidence gets hidden in a remote location and everyone walks away as if it never happened until all is forgotten - and then the evidence is quietly discarded. It's time for HDC to acknowledge that the GBO project has failed, figure out the collateral damage and fess-up to it, make an new plan and then continue on. In contrast, 14 years ago my ITB passed the 2 "Proof of Concept" field tests conducted by HDC engineers to demonstrate its functionality at McNary and Ice Harbor Dams that are detailed here: 2006-03-03 HOT Meeting PowerPoint (HDC).htm. It could be construed as "validation" when HDC engineers deemed that my ITB's "Results virtually identical to those obtained using COE data acq system" and that my ITB was 'Ready for "unattended, automated" data collection.' The remaining question is: When HDC engineers had a proven, workable system in 2006 why didn't they just start using it instead of trying to copy it? My ITB project has continued on to successfully conduct 4 separate index tests to map out the entire 3-D Cam surface on a 5 MW Kaplan turbine located about 2- hours South of HDC in Portland Oregon with plans to demonstrate this successful test to BPA and HDC managers and to DOE and DOD IGs. The maintenance team at the dam was a small company consisting of 3 USACE retirees who were already familiar with index testing. They were delighted and excited to learn that my ITB methodology allows me to index test Kaplan turbines without going to the dam, saving thousands of dollars on each and every index test. When they presented this new testing method to HDC, the pushback retaliation against me for blowing the whistle on HDC's Intellectual Property theft 12 years earlier harmed their business and compelled them to breakoff contact with me in order to continue getting work from USACE. In accordance with the government's stated position that no determination would be made until a successful index test of a turbine was concluded by someone - because my Index Test Box has been used 4-times successfully and HDC's Gate Blade Optimizer is apparently a failure I am requesting that DOD IG reopen the investigation and compare my ITB technology with HDC's GBO technology for a more objective and fact-based assessment. Respectfully yours, Doug Albright Actuation Test Equipment Company This e-mail is from the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, and may contain information that is "Law Enforcement Sensitive" {LES} or "For Official Use Only" {FOUO} or otherwise subject to the Privacy Act and/or legal and or other privileges that restrict release without appropriate legal authority.